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Introduction
Neither police nor judges seem to play the leading role in the investigation and the criminal decision process. Prior to judicial decisions, a growing share of cases has already been discharged by the public prosecutor. In both the U.S. and European legal systems, the crucial discretionary power of the prosecutor is to determine which case should be disposed of before trial by either dismissal of the charges or by imposing certain obligations on suspects in exchange for laying the file aside. Such practices are known as pre-trial diversion or informal sanctions. In Germany, the portion of crime suspects formally convicted in a court (under general and juvenile penal law) compared to all people sanctioned (informally and formally) steadily declined from 64% in 1981 to 42% in 2008 (Heinz, 2010, p.50) . The prosecutor accounts for the bulk of all cases, the judges in courts are only responsible for 14.5% of all dismissals.
2 Criminal policy in the U.S. followed a quite different path. Whereas Western
European countries such as Germany adopted policies of diversion and non-custodial sentences, in the U.S., as a response to increased severity of sanctions (see Raphael and Stoll, 2009 ), the incarceration rate of the state prison populations grew at an unprecedented rate, nearly quadrupling between the mid 1970s and the present, and reached the unprecedented number of 756 prisoners per 100,000 of the national population in 2006 (see Walmsley, 2009 ). However, the crucial question is whether the benefits from smaller imprisonment rates have been offset by higher costs of crime in response to decreasing general deterrence. A look at German data reveals that at least German violent crime rates show a continuous upward trend and have more than doubled since the beginning of the 1970s (GESIS, 2007) .
To fully understand the impact of criminal policies in the U.S., Germany and elsewhere, the role of key players and their decisions, i.e. interactions of police, prosecutors and courts representing the law enforcement system (Van Tulder and Van der Torre, 1999) have to be taken into account. Many studies only rely on the probability of detection, i.e. on the role of police, when discussing the role of 'expected' sanctions. Other studies, in particular articles dealing with U.S. data and thus motivated by the highly persistent upward trend in prisoner population, focus on the imprisonment rate and the severity of sanctions as crucial factors of deterrence (see the survey by Donohue, 2009 ). Only few studies also cover the risk of convictions, e.g. by the ratio of convictions to arrests. Among these exceptions are the early papers by Sjoquist (1973) , Carr-Hill and Stern (1973) , and Wolpin (1978) based on regional cross-sectional data. Cornwell and Trumbull (1994, their approach was replicated by Baltagi, 2006) , who also were among the first authors who applied panel econometrics, presented exceptional work because of their comprehensive list of law enforcement variables containing the probabilities of arrest, conviction (conditional on arrest), and imprisonment (conditional on conviction) as well as the severity of sanctions. However, the general impression is that only few studies have taken account of all factors, something that was also pointed out by Mustard (2003) as well as Mendes and McDonald (2001) . In particular the interplay of conviction rates and sentence lengths, i.e. essential components of certainty and expected severity of punishment, have been neglected. However, it is obvious that components of general deterrence do not work independently of each other. Missing factors of law enforcement might cause severe omitted variable biases.
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This paper focuses on the German experience, where in particular the steadily increasing discretionary power given to prosecutors and the vast range of potential custodial and noncustodial sanctions is of general importance. To cope with the manifold situation of all stages of the prosecution process, theoretical and econometric modeling consider the activities of the police, public prosecution and courts, i.e. the probability of being arrested by the police, the probability of being convicted conditional upon arrest, and the probabilities of being imprisoned, being fined or being on probation given conviction. As the Criminal Law Reform entailed changes away from short-term custodial sanctions, also the average length of prison sentences should be focused on when calculating the expected costs of committing a crime.
As will become clear in the course of the paper, conditional on identical clearance rates, expected sanctions strongly differ given prevailing regional (state) criminal prosecution policies. Similar to Kessler and Piehl (1998) and Lacasse and Payne (1999) , the analysis focuses on the degree of discretion in the criminal justice system and it studies the impact of regional discretion on law enforcement and justice system outcomes. Unlike quoted studies, which analyze explanatory factors such as heterogeneity of social norms, this paper exploits data and information from different experiences and performances amongst coexisting and competing criminal justice policies of federal states.
Conclusions will be based on structural econometric evidence 4 of a theoretical model which considers both formal and informal and as well as non-custodial and custodial sanctions (e.g. sentences on and without probation). The resulting augmented supply of offences is estimated using a unique database combining information from different sources of official judicial statistics covering 24 years of criminal sanctioning practices of (West) German states. It provides offence and age-specific crime rates of three major violent and four property types and maps the comprehensive system of criminal prosecution, including decisions regarding type (fine, probation, imprisonment) and extent (length of prison sentence) of punishment.
Results presented in this article suggest that crime is particularly deterred by the certainty of conviction. Here, contrary to popular belief, neither police nor judges but public prosecutors play the leading role. Extending the severity of sentences, however, does not seem to provide a suitable strategy for fighting crime. In particular, the length of the imprisonment term proves insignificant.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a model of custodial and non-custodial sentencing. Section 3 highlights descriptive evidence showing prevailing heterogeneity of sentencing practices at the disaggregated state level in Germany. In Section 4 econometric results are presented. Section 5 concludes.
Theoretical Considerations: Custodial and NonCustodial Sentences in a Model of Crime
In order to understand the roles of police, prosecutors and courts in empirical data and econometric estimations, in this chapter the standard model of general deterrence is extended by considering custodial and non-custodial sentences. This distinction is of importance because non-custodial sentences are usually considered less severe than unconditional custodial sentences, and because data reveal significant trends towards higher shares of noncustodial sentencing (see Chapter 3). The framework maps the cascade police/public prosecution/court/sentencing decisions with a model of time allocation. Ehrlich (1973) introduced this approach into the economics of crime. He considers an individual who allocates his fixed amount of time between legal and illegal income-generating activities.
Many authors have applied and extended the model, but also questioned some of Ehrlich's 4 See, among others, Heckman (2000) and Deaton (2010) , and the Symposium of the Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(2), for the importance of structural econometrics in public policy analysis.
general results. Block and Heineke (1975) , in particular, attacked Ehrlich's findings by showing that if the time allocated to legal and illegal activity is introduced into the utility function any comparative static result would be impossible without further assumptions.
Nevertheless, the subsequent model in the tradition of previous work of, among others, Ehrlich (1973) , Block and Heineke (1975) , Wolpin (1978 Wolpin ( , 1980 , Witte (1980) , Zhang (1997) , Grogger (1998), and Funk (2004) = probability of conviction if brought to court, i.e. p combines the discretionary work of police, it captures incentives from varying informal sanctions (through decisions of public prosecution), and it covers the fact of a conviction (conditional on indictment), but does not include the sentence itself. This decomposition is of importance for the econometric model (see below), where the respective individual roles of police, public prosecutors and judges need to be identified separately. 5 In the present theoretical model, we refrain from splitting up the decision process into further ramifications such that it suffices to consider the overall effect of p.
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As outlined in the Introduction, the main focus of this article is to contrast severity and certainty of sanctions through 'tough' (unconditional, 'custodial') prison sentences on the one hand, and more lenient sentencing practices, such as probation, parole and fines, henceforth defined as 'non-custodial sentences', as well as informal sanctions on the other hand. 
emerging with probability (1-p). If detected, brought to court and convicted, either utility
occurs in case of non-custodial sentences with probability
would apply with probability L covers legal income opportunities despite a preceding conviction, it is relevant for offenders who are convicted on probation or sentenced to fines.
As the share of unconditional imprisonment is strongly declining over time at least in Germany 7 , it would be misleading to retain the standard model of crime which does assume zero income for convicted offenders (as in equation 2.3). According to modern criminal law, imprisonment is considered as ultima ratio of the penal law. 8 The idea behind this norm is that non-custodial sentences should prevent negative experiences behind bars (see Bayer et al., 2009 , as well as Chen and Shapiro, 2007 , for recent evidence on this issue) and enable convicted offenders to work in the legal sector, although previous records and fines cause an income gap such that expected payoffs are below those without conviction (see equation
can be interpreted as the stigma effect from previous convictions (Rasmussen, 1996 , Funk, 2004 , and the result of fines.
Individuals maximize expected utility, i.e (2.4)
subject to the given time constraint. Unambiguous first-order conditions (see Appendix) require some further assumptions: (2.5)
Thus, in addition to classical results confirming the crime reducing effects of probability (p) and severity (F) of punishment, the results show that higher rates of non-custodial sentences increase crime. Thus, when courts change their judgment preferences towards probation and financial punishments, the model predicts increasing incentives to allocate time to illegal activities. Since p includes the probability of trial if detected, i.e. | ac cl p , p is also driven by diversion. Hence the model also predicts that higher ratios of informal sentences, i.e. rising shares of suspects dismissed by public prosecutors, will increase crime rates.
Finally, the higher the stigma from a previous conviction, the higher is the effect of deterrence:
This effect is also called 'dynamic deterrence' in the literature because the threat of future income losses due to stigma would deter crime today (see Imai and Krishna, 2004) .
Summing up, derived signs are consistent with expected effects of rational choice theory.
However, as was already stated by Block and Heineke (1975) , the signing of variables is not merely a theoretical question but demands econometric tests. They are going to be provided in The growing influence of public prosecution has led to a strongly decreasing ratio of convictions to suspects which shrank from 63.5% in 1981 to 41.8% in 2008 (Table 1) . Table 2 confirms that this falling ratio is not affected by a changing share of acquittals ordered by judges in a court. The share of convictions of suspects brought to court is pretty stable over time, with minima and maxima ranging between 81.3% in 1990 and 83.7% in 2000. cases concerning offences which are not punishable by a minimum penalty of one year or more (see Heinz, 2006 , or Weigend, 1995 . 12 Note that numbers in East Germany do not differ much from the development in West Germany (see Heinz, 2010) . 13 In 2008, the ratio of dismissals without further legal restraints to all dismissals (by courts and prosecutors) amounted to 87% (own calculation based on Heinz, 2010, p. 49-52).
The econometric evidence of this paper is based on 'adults' aged 21 years or more. The reason for this restriction is the German penal law which distinguishes between juveniles (persons aged 14 to 17 years), adolescents (18 to 20 years) and adults (21 years or more). The juvenile penal code makes frequent use of two forms of punishment not provided for in the general penal code, corrective penalties (educational aid and supervision, issuing of instructions) and disciplinary measures (mandatory labor service, juvenile detention).
Furthermore, sentences pronounced according to the juvenile penal code are principally less severe, this being reflected in the fact that, for example, the longest sentence is only half as long as that provided for by the general penal code and that no juvenile sentence (not even for murder) exceeds 10 years. Adolescents (persons aged 18 to 20 years) are also excluded from the empirical analysis as it is at the discretion of the judge whether they are sentenced according to either the juvenile penal code or the general penal code, a circumstance which prevents econometric testing of any penal system for this age group (see Entorf, 2011 , for the microeconometric analysis of the endogenous selection of adolescents to judicial systems).
Descriptive Evidence on Criminal Prosecution in Germany
In order to map the criminal prosecution process as comprehensively as possible, subsequent econometric evidence is based on two sources of official statistics -police crime statistics (PCS) and criminal prosecution statistics (StVStat). These data sets have been carefully matched by Spengler (2004 Spengler ( , 2006 ). 14 Information is acquired for seven 'classic' categories of crime (murder and manslaughter, rape and indecent assault, robbery, aggravated assault, serious theft, petty theft and fraud) for each of the former West German states for the period from 1977 -2001. As the sample is restricted to the former West German part, it is possible to cover rather long time series.
15
14 The creation of a comprehensive system of indicators for crime and prosecution requires merging data on crime and suspects from police data (PCS) with data on criminal prosecution collected by the German Statistical Office (StVStat). Among others, considerable difficulties were found in different registration categories in PCS and StVStat statistics, in treating offenders who have committed various offences which are simultaneously tried in court, the disparity between PCS and StVStat in the registration date, and revision of suspect counts in the PCS. As discussed at length in Spengler (2004 Spengler ( , 2006 , most of these data problems were dispelled by suitable approximations. 15 However, given that the newly formed German states have had an impact on the overall German law system as well as on income, unemployment, population structure etc. after German unification in 1990, considering isolated 'West' or 'East' German universes more and more ceases to be a sensible research strategy. Considering a period such as 1977 to 2001 might thus be considered a compromise between the advantages of long time series on the one hand and structural changes in the population of interest on the other hand. After suspects are detected by the police, it then becomes the task of the public prosecutor's office to legally and factually evaluate the accusation and to reach a final decision regarding the investigative procedure. Essentially, the latter can result in the case being dropped owing to the uncertain probability of sentencing, in diversion or in an indictment. In the case of an 16 Descriptive statistics of included variables are presented in the Appendix.
indictment the suspect is subject to sentencing by a court. In Table 3 , column (2), the share of cases passed on to court is referred to as the indictment rate. The large drop in criminal proceedings confirms the highly influential discretionary power of the public prosecutor at the The trial can result in acquittal, in the proceedings being dismissed or end in a conviction. In contrast to the indictment rate, the proportion of trials resulting in a conviction, i.e. the court conviction rate 17 , remained rather stable, as can be seen from the examples of theft and assault in Table 3 , column (3). The ratio of acquittals and dismissals based on trials in case of serious assault, however, significantly exceeds that of serious theft (37% versus 17%, on average).
Regarding the certainty of a conviction, it is straightforward to calculate the product of indictment rates and court conviction rates, yielding the ratio of suspects brought to and convicted in a court. Henceforth this proportion is defined as the (overall) conviction rate.
In as far as a sentence is passed, the judge's verdict can, according to the adult penal code, take the form of either a non-suspended prison sentence, a suspended prison sentence -i.e.
one which is suspended on probation -or a fine. The corresponding indicators are imprisonment rate, probation rate and fine rate, respectively (Table 3 , columns (4) to (6)).
For the various forms of punishment the severity of the penalty is measured by the length of the non-suspended prison sentence handed down and by the number of per-diem fines, respectively. 17 Note that we distinguish between the conviction rate performed in a court and the conviction rate defined as the ratio of convictions to suspects with the latter being consistent with the theoretical and econometric meaning of 'convictions'.
The somewhat more punitive behavior from the late 1990s onwards is the result of a 1998 reform of the reform of 1969 (see Busch, 2005 , for the history of all reforms since the Grand
Criminal Law Reform of 1969). This reform (6th Strafrechtsreformgesetz) is the legislative outcome of preceding discussions on the inconsistency of existing sentences and degrees of penalties with the Werteordnung (value system) of the German Constitution. The debate was raised because sentences for violent crimes appeared to be unjustifiably lenient compared to sentences for property crimes. As a consequence, in a reform of the Grand Reform new (more severe) maximum and minimum penalties were introduced for many violent crimes (for example: the minimum/ maximum penalty for aggravated assault was 3 months/ 5 years before the reform, and it is 6 months/ 10 years after the reform).
Summing up, the most prominent trend of the German sentencing practice is the tendency towards lower indictment rates (see Table 3 , column 2) which is in line with the idea of the German Criminal Law Reform (1969) and confirms the increasing importance of diversion and informal sentencing in Germany (see Heinz, 2006 Heinz, , 2010 , for more descriptive evidence).
Regarding the long time span of included time series, it is necessary to consider changes in the demographic structure. In Germany, the ratio of the young population under 20 years of Taking aggravated assaults as a example, crime suspects of the age group 20 to 64 years follow the hump shaped time series of the demographic change, but the drop of their share in total crimes during the 1990s is stronger than the drop of the share of the same age group in the resident population, indicating strongly increasing shares of juveniles and adolescents in the group of offenders.
Thus, ignoring the changing share of crime-prone aged people would lead to a downward bias of crime rates of the active population. In order to adjust for demographic changes and to focus on persons in the 'criminally active' age group, age specific crime rates should be considered in the econometric analysis. As these are not available, they have been approximated under the assumption that the (unknown) age distribution of criminals is similar to the (known) age distribution of suspects. 
Heterogeneity of Criminal Policy at the State Level
Germany's 16 states (the German 'Laender') enjoy a certain autonomy, in particular in the areas of law, education, social assistance, and police, within a federal system. Thus, different Table 4 gives details on the discrepancies between the two states. As regards the role of the public prosecutor, the most remarkable differences can be detected for assault and theft.
Whereas conviction rates for assault were about the same in both states and even higher for theft in Schleswig-Holstein than in Bavaria before 1990, the recent period shows a strongly reverted picture: The probability of 'conviction' (i. Notes: Rates are adjusted for changes in the structure of the German residential population and restricted to the age group of 21 to under 60 years (see the text for details); entries represent averages of denoted time periods in percent. Conviction rate = (indictment rate) x (rate of conviction in court decisions); expected length of imprisonment = (clearance rate) x (conviction rate) x (imprisonment rate) x (average length of imprisonment).
Given precedent probabilities of conviction and imprisonment, it is not surprising that also expected values of the expected length of imprisonment differ substantially. In Table 4 , the expected duration is defined as the product of the clearance rate, conviction rate, imprisonment rate and the average (realized) length of the prison sentence. In Bavaria, offenders of all types of crime face longer expected prison terms than in Schleswig-Holstein.
After 1990, albeit at a low level, most expected durations in Bavarian prisons are more than twice the Schleswig-Holstein value. Given that all crimes were reported to the police, in Schleswig-Holstein robbers would take the risk of 2.4 months in custody (compared to 4.9 months in Bavaria), committing rape and sexual assault would imply the risk of 3.1 months (5.7 months in Bavaria), aggravated assault would cause just 6 days in prison (12 days in Bavaria), and the expected prison sentences for serious theft and petty theft were 4 days and 0.6 days (12 days and 2.4 days), respectively.
Econometric Evidence

Econometric Modeling and Methodological Aspects
The econometric model is based on the theoretical framework of informal, custodial and noncustodial sentencing derived in Section 2, eventually leading to the augmented version of the classical supply of offences: Previous descriptive evidence has revealed that criminal prosecution indicators display a high variation both across the federal states and throughout the observation period. The econometric analysis will thus make use of the conviction rate rather than considering 20 The impact of
has not been tested; there are no regional data on the difference between wages with and without criminal record. Therefore, testing the criminal stigma impact must be left for future research. separate indictment and court conviction rates, having in mind that the variance of the (overall) conviction rate is mainly driven by public prosecution activities over time and across states. The following variables related to police, public prosecution and courts will be included: The crime rate will be subsequently related to the criminal prosecution indicators described above and to further explanatory variables derived from the economic theory of crime. The latter consist of the real per-capita gross domestic product and the unemployment rate, both representing legal and illegal income opportunities. Moreover, the share of young males between 15 and 24 as well as the share of migrants in the population cover demographic heterogeneities of crime-prone risk groups. 21 The time series of Berlin are disregarded because of their structural break after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Descriptive statistics are summarized in Table A1 (Appendix).
The general estimation strategy is grounded on the fact that the observed crime rate, which relies on the number of crimes reported to the police, does not coincide with the actual crime rate. However, assuming that "observed number of crimes = share of crimes reported to the police  actual number of crimes  measurement error", i.e. Results by Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) reveal that disregarding unobserved heterogeneity would lead to substantial overestimation of deterrence effects. Sources of such biases can also be seen, for example, in the basic attitude of the state population towards illegal acts, in the peculiarities of the state prosecution systems which are not accounted for by the prosecution indicators deployed, especially in varying levels of underreporting, or in changes of the measurement of the endogenous variable such as changing definitions of and allocations to crime categories.
The particular econometric model to be estimated is as follows:
where kit C is the crime rate (in logs) per 100,000 inhabitants for category k in state i and time t. D is the set of deterrence and criminal prosecution variables considered in the theoretical model and equation (4.1); X is the vector of covariates discussed above. Equation (4.4) represents the econometric model for two pooled and generalized crime categories (see Levitt, 1997 Levitt, , 2002 , for a similar approach). First, cross-crime parameter restrictions are constrained to be identical for all violent crimes, i.e. k = murder and assault, rape and indecent assault, aggravated assault. In the second estimation model, all property crimes, i.e. k = theft, robbery, and fraud, are summarized. The advantage of this estimation strategy is that it provides a more concise summary of the effects and, given the imposed restrictions are valid, more precise point estimates. The potential drawback of the restrictions is that imposed restrictions may
give a misleading picture of structural parameters. Therefore, estimates of individual crime categories of the impact of police, prosecutors and court decisions will be presented in the Appendix (Tables A4 and A5 ).
The basic estimation method is pooled FGLS, where category-specific weights allow for heteroskedasticity across crime categories. The estimation includes state-specific effects to capture crime-specific variation across German states, and year dummies which ought to cover crime-specific trends. The estimation is based on a category-specific SUR covariance structure which allows for conditional correlation between the contemporaneous residuals for crime categories k and l, but restricts residuals in different categories to be uncorrelated.
Specifically, we assume that
( 4.6) 11 1 1 ...
involves covariances across cross-sections (i.e. crime-categories) as in a seemingly unrelated regressions type framework. Robust standard errors are calculated using the panel corrected standard error (PCSE) methodology (Beck and Katz, 1995; Reed and Ye, 2009 ).
There is no scholary consensus as to the critical question whether crime rates must be differenced or not. In Entorf and Spengler (2008) ADF unit root tests reveal that a large fraction of log-crime rates (in particular for property crimes) have a unit root or are close to a unit root. However, for other time series as the one for murder and manslaughter as well as for rape and indecent assault the null on nonstationarity is clearly rejected. At the same time, explanatory variables such as GDP, unemployment or share of migrants all are nonstationary. Spelman (2008) comes to the conclusion that in situations like this the best specification of the crime equation must rely on differenced data, and that alternative specifications run a substantial risk of spurious results (see also Entorf, 1997) . The econometric approach in this paper follows Spelman's suggestion; all estimates use growth rates of dependent and explanatory variables. (2)). Thus, regional or general trends towards probation and non-custodial sentences are associated with higher property crime rates. The second indicator of the severity of sanctions, length of imprisonment terms, is insignificant throughout all specifications. A comparison of presented estimates to previous results using German data is not straightforward, as former tests of the deterrence hypothesis are based on an incomplete set of criminal prosecution variables. As regards the significance of clearance rates, results align with findings in Entorf and Spengler (2000) and Entorf and Winker (2008) .
Estimation Results
Testing significance of parameters using differenced data in addition to the inclusion of time and state effects can be considered a rather conservative estimation strategy. Perhaps not surprisingly, significance of covariates is reduced when time effects are included, as can be seen from comparing column (2) (Table 5) to columns (3) and (4). Parameters on covariates 22 Of, course, fines are not always applicable (e.g. in case of murder/ manslaughter) such that the ratio of fines is zero in these cases. 23 In general, data cover the time series 1977 to 2001, leading to 240 observations (in growth rates). Different starting points for few states, and, following some communication with representatives of the German Statistical Office, omitting faulty and evidently misrecorded data points causes eight missing values such that Tables 5 and  further results are based on 232 observations. based on estimations without period effects are in line with expectations and confirm previous results found in the literature: Higher unemployment (see, e.g., Raphael and Winter-Ebmer ,2001; Lin, 2008) , higher shares of migrants as well as higher ratios of young males increase the risk of property crime rates. GDP per capita, however, is not found to be related to property crime rates. Notes: Robust cross-section SUR (PCSE) standard errors (d.f. corrected) in parentheses; **), *) significant at the 1 and 5 percent level; a) Tested (F-tests) against 'state effects=no, period effects = yes'; b) tested against 'state effects=yes, period effects = no'; c) tested against 'state effects=no, period effects = no'.
As suggested by Mustard (2003) and Mendes and MacDonald (2001) , among others, ignoring some integral part of the criminal prosecution and criminal deterrence mechanism might cause a serious omitted variable bias. This can be seen from Table 5 , column (5), where the impacts of public prosecutors as well as of judges are not taken into account. Here, even after including period effects which might compensate for omitted time-dependent variation, the clearance rate turns out to be insignificant, while it was clearly significant throughout all fully specified models.
Replicating the same estimation procedure for violent crimes (murder/ manslaughter, rape and indecent assault, serious assault; see Table 6 ) leads to similar results, but with one important exception: In contrast to property crime, there is no significant effect coming from the severity of sanctions. Other results, such as the strong effect regarding certainty of conviction are confirmed, with responses to the clearance rate being even more pronounced than in Table   5 . Again, there is indication that variations of high-risk population groups (young males, share of migrants) are positively related to crime rates. Comparing the size of parameter estimates in Table 5 to those of Table 6 reveals that violent crime seems to be particularly strongly affected by the share of young males in the population. Unemployment and GDP growth interchanged roles. In Table 6 , GDP per capita has a negative sign and is at least weakly significant in columns (3) and (4), whereas unemployment rates turn out insignificant. Finally, as with property crimes, ignoring the influence of prosecutors and judges would result in an omitted variable bias (Table 6 , column (5)).
A problem of estimation with panel data -especially in the case of large time-series dimensions -is the existence of serial correlation of residuals. Serial correlation is mainly a problem of regression in levels (and not in first differences or growth rates) and might 'only' cause misleading estimates of standard errors (a problem which is counteracted by calculating autocorrelation-and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors), but can, however, also be an indication of a misspecification of the model and, correspondingly, of biased estimation of coefficients themselves. Inspecting results of serial correlation tests in Tables 5 and 6 . 1 . 1 . 1
(1 ) ( ) ( ) Durbin, 1960) . Equation (4.7) (using restrictions (4.5) and (4.6)) is estimated using nonlinear least squares. Tables A2 and A3 (see Appendix) reveal that results based on specification (4.7) do not differ substantially from corresponding estimates based on equation (4.4). The only remarkable change is the more pronounced and negative effect of GDP per capita on violent crimes in specifications (3) and (4) which is significant after correcting for overdifferencing in Table A3 , while it is not so in Table 6 . Potential simultaneity between the crime rate and explanatory factors of deterrence might require the use of instrument variable estimators (IV estimators). When the incidence of crime is not only influenced by the clearance rate but also vice versa, estimates which do not account for the endogeneity of explanatory variables might lead to inconsistency problems.
There are several conceivable reasons for the interrelation of crime rate and clearance. The size of the clearance rate might depend, for example, on the overloading of police resulting from an unexpected rise in crime. Owing to the overloading of police capacity the clearance rate will sink, the absolute number of cases solved remaining constant. Since the crime rate is rising simultaneously, the negative partial correlation between clearance rate and crime incidence would be overestimated in least-squares applications. This could be counterbalanced by a potential underestimation for at least two reasons. First, criminal policy would respond to increasing crime rates by allocating public resources to the police, resulting in higher clearance rates. A second reason is related to the share of undocumented crimes in the actual number of crimes which likewise depends on police resources, in particular for offence types revealed by monitoring/controls and/or random spot checks. 24 This apparently would lead to spurious positive correlation between crime rates and clearance rates. Against this background, IV estimations are conducted with the goal of neutralising possible simultaneity relationships between crime rate and clearance rate.
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The successful application of IV estimations crucially depends upon the existence of adequate instrument variables which are correlated with the endogenous explanatory variables while being simultaneously uncorrelated with the error term. IV results in Table 6 depend on three extraneous exogenous variables and lagged endogenous variables. The first extraneous variable is public debt per capita. Following arguments put forward by Levitt (1997 Levitt ( , 2002 , it is reasonable to assume that increasing public spending would lead to more police such that detection probabilities are going up. The second extraneous variable is attempt ratio (reported uncompleted offences/reported offences): Regions with a relatively large number of attempts will attract more attention by the police such that clearance rates are expected to be higher.
The third variable is the share of crimes committed in small villages (less than 20,000 inhabitants). The variation in rural crime scenes is associated with varying degrees of anonymity. As rural neighborhood is assumed to be associated with less anonymity, an increasing share of crimes committed in smaller villages is expected to be associated with a higher probability of detection. Both ratios emerge ex post from the realization of illegal activities and have no direct impact on endogenous variables. Finally, as estimation are 24 One third of petty thefts in Germany, for example, are cases of shoplifting (Bundeskriminalamt, 2004 (Bundeskriminalamt, , 2010 . As a rule, however, registered cases of shoplifting are characterized by an offender being caught red-handed, the case being cleared immediately. If, ceteris paribus, the number of registered cases of shoplifting were now to increase through an increase (decrease) in controls, the petty-theft rate would then rise (fall) with simultaneously increasing (decreasing) specific clearance rate. 25 Simultaneities between the crime rate and other criminal prosecution indicators are also conceivable. As these are less apparent than in the case of the clearance rate, however, they remain unaccounted for.
performed in growth rates, also lags of order two of endogenous variables (following suggestions in Anderson and Hsiao, 1981, and Arellano and Bond, 1981) are included as instruments. Notes: IV-estimation of equation (4.4) under pooled FGLS restrictions (4.5) and (4.6); list of additional common IV: log(clearance rate t-2 ), log(crime rate t-2 ), growth rates of the following three variables: regional public debt, attempt ratio, share of crimes committed in small villages; 2SLS-Ftests (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 99) test 'state effects=no, period effects = yes' against 'state effects=yes, period effects = yes'; test of overidentification is based on Results of estimating equation (4.4) using IV are presented in Table 7 . As is often the case with IV, parameter estimates on instrumented variables become larger with IV (at least for property crimes), but results become less reliable. When comparing results in Table 7 to corresponding results in columns (2) and (4) of Tables 5 and 6 , the probability of detection keeps its significance just for one specification. The interpretation of this significant estimate, however, suffers from some potential invalidity of chosen instruments, as indicated by Sargan's overidentification test. Thus, shown results cast some doubt on the deterrent effect of clearance rates. Unfortunately, however, IV estimations are no panacea for endogeneity problems such that no final conclusion can be drawn.
Parameter estimates on conviction rates, imprisonment rates and the severity of prison sentence are almost unaffected. Results confirm that the influence of public prosecutors in combination with convictions in a court is the most important element of the interlinked criminal prosecution process: Lowering convictions rates would increase both property and violent crime rates. This does not unanimously hold for the severity of sanctions.
Unconditional imprisonment (instead of suspended custodial sentence or fines) only deters property crime, whereas there is no significant effect on violent crimes. The length of imprisonment does not play any role at all. (Table 7) suggest that, notwithstanding problems of neglected unobserved heterogeneity, higher wealth (either in terms of higher GDP p.c. or less unemployment) is associated with less crime, whereas the presence of demographic risk groups (young males, citizens with migration background) is found to be a significant factor of both property and violent crimes.
Conclusions
This study disentangles the deterrent effect of criminal prosecution by analyzing the relative contribution of its components police, public prosecution and courts. The entire process, from the police investigation till the judge's verdict, is illustrated and econometrically related to major property and violent crime rates.
The results show that a deterrent effect is exerted by the first two stages of the criminal prosecution process, representing the certainty of conviction. Accordingly, a crime reducing impact would be obtained for higher clearance rates, in particular for crimes against property, although IV estimations indicate loss of significance. Clear results, however, are obtained for the 'conviction rate', which represents the degree of 'certainty' that a suspect is brought to court and convicted in a trial. This result confirms theoretical predictions outlined in the model of custodial and non-custodial sentences of the paper. Conversely, for the indicators of the severity of punishment (type and extent of punishment) deterrent effects are less robust.
The effect of imprisonment is only significantly negative for violent crimes. For property crimes, however, changing the judgment towards non-custodial sentences does not have any significant positive or negative effect. The same result occurs for the length of prison sentences.
Summarizing findings, an important implication for public policy is the critical examination of costs and benefits of prevailing pre-trial diversion applied by public prosecutors, i.e. of dropping cases for reasons of the so-called expediency principle. Against the background of high social costs of crime in general and currently rising costs due to aggravated assaults in particular (see general trends in Section 3), it is questionable whether this tendency of public prosecution is actually economically and socially expedient. 'General deterrence' is still capable of curbing crime rates, but just by a more rigorous application of existing penal laws rather than by reforms extending the severity of measures. The latter strategy, followed in the U.S., might bear the risk that the prison population increases without any effect of deterrence.
Several authors point out that the U.S. criminal policy might be caught within such dynamics (see Raphael and Stoll, 2009 ). European policy, on its part, should avoid the error of playing down the risk of its own vicious circle of (violent) crime. Cutting back some diversion reforms such as the exaggerated practice of dropping cases for reasons of expediency, for example, might prevent much harsher future measures that would become necessary in response to public pressure when rates of violent crime are going to continue their current upward trend. 
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